Purpose of the letter
Addressed to President George W. Bush in the months after the September 2001 attacks, the letter thanked the administration for its response to international terrorism and urged it to maintain strong support for the Israeli government during a period of escalating Israeli–Palestinian violence.
The authors described Israel and the United States as confronting related security challenges. They argued that attacks on civilians in Israel should be understood within the wider counterterrorism framework then guiding U.S. foreign policy.
The letter also linked the conflict to concerns about support provided by regional governments and armed organizations. Its authors presented this connection as a reason for Washington to treat Israeli security as part of a broader U.S. strategic interest.
Position on Palestinian leadership
The authors rejected criticism that the Bush administration was primarily responsible for the lack of diplomatic progress. They attributed the immediate crisis to attacks and to decisions made by the Palestinian Authority's leadership.
They argued that Yasser Arafat should no longer be treated as a credible negotiating partner. To support that position, the letter referred to the failure of negotiations in 2000, the subsequent uprising and the continuing violence of early 2002. These interpretations were politically contested at the time and remain part of the historical debate over responsibility, diplomacy and security.
The letter maintained that negotiations should not proceed under coercion or in response to attacks. It consequently urged the United States not to pressure Israel into talks with Arafat and not to provide financial support where it believed resources could contribute to violence.
Recommended U.S. response
The authors called on the United States to support Israeli operations intended to disrupt armed networks. They acknowledged that such efforts would be difficult and argued that reducing the capacity for future attacks could eventually create space for a more representative and peaceful Palestinian political order.
The letter also urged faster U.S. action to remove Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq. It cited concerns about unconventional weapons, Iraqi support for violent groups and alleged connections to international terrorism. Some of the letter's intelligence-related assertions were disputed or reassessed in later public investigations and should be read as claims made in the policy environment of 2002.
More broadly, the authors argued that democratic government and political freedom offered a stronger route to regional peace than accommodation with authoritarian governments. They framed consistent opposition to terrorism, support for allies and political reform as parts of one strategic approach.
Conclusion
The letter concluded that Israeli security and American security were closely connected for both strategic and moral reasons. It urged the administration to apply its stated counterterrorism principles consistently across the region.
The document was signed by a group of policy writers, analysts and former public officials.
Signatories listed on the document
- William Kristol
- Ken Adelman
- Gary Bauer
- Jeffrey Bell
- William J. Bennett
- Ellen Bork
- Linda Chavez
- Eliot Cohen
- Midge Decter
- Thomas Donnelly
- Nicholas Eberstadt
- Hillel Fradkin
- Frank Gaffney
- Jeffrey Gedmin
- Reuel Marc Gerecht
- Charles Hill
- Bruce P. Jackson
- Donald Kagan
- Robert Kagan
- John Lehman
- Tod Lindberg
- Rich Lowry
- Clifford May
- Joshua Muravchik
- Martin Peretz
- Richard Perle
- Daniel Pipes
- Norman Podhoretz
- Stephen P. Rosen
- Randy Scheunemann
- Gary Schmitt
- William Schneider, Jr.
- Marshall Wittmann
- R. James Woolsey