Addressed to congressional leaders, the letter maintained that the U.S. military was too small for the responsibilities assigned to it during the early years of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.
Editorial context
This page summarizes a historical policy document. References to force levels, deployments, fiscal conditions and officeholders reflect the circumstances of January 2005, not present-day conditions. Inclusion in New American Century documents the debate and does not imply endorsement.
The argument presented
The authors called on Congress to substantially increase the active-duty strength of the Army and Marine Corps. They proposed using a combined annual increase of at least 25,000 personnel over several years as a planning objective, while recognizing that Congress would determine the eventual size and structure.
The letter connected this recommendation to operational demands in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as continuing alliance and defense commitments elsewhere. Its authors contended that repeated deployments were placing unsustainable pressure on active and reserve components and that long-term engagement in the wider Middle East required a larger pool of available ground forces.
Readiness and personnel
The document cited contemporary warnings from Army Reserve leadership about overuse. It argued that reserve forces were being employed too routinely and that expanding active-duty strength would distribute deployments more responsibly across the force.
The authors also emphasized the service of military personnel in combat, humanitarian operations and support for emerging political institutions. In their view, increasing manpower and equipment was a practical way to uphold the government's obligations to those serving in both regular and reserve formations.
Resources and fiscal priorities
Recognizing concerns about federal deficits, the letter nevertheless treated national defense as a primary responsibility of government. It asserted that the country could finance both a larger ground force and military modernization without returning to the scale or structure associated with the Cold War.
The argument relied in part on defense spending as a share of the economy at that time. The authors presented the proposed personnel increase as a targeted response to the missions then underway rather than a general restoration of an earlier force model.
Congressional responsibility
The appeal concluded by referring to Congress's constitutional authority to raise and support the armed forces. The signatories described themselves as a bipartisan group with differing policy views but a shared belief that legislators should provide enough personnel to carry out U.S. obligations and foreign-policy objectives.
Listed signatories
The source associated the following policy specialists, former officials and retired military officers with the letter:
- Peter Beinart
- Jeffrey Bergner
- Daniel Blumenthal
- Max Boot
- Eliot Cohen
- Ivo H. Daalder
- Thomas Donnelly
- Michele Flournoy
- Frank F. Gaffney, Jr.
- Reuel Marc Gerecht
- Lt. Gen. Buster C. Glosson, USAF retired
- Bruce P. Jackson
- Frederick Kagan
- Robert Kagan
- Craig Kennedy
- Paul Kennedy
- Col. Robert Killebrew, USA retired
- William Kristol
- Will Marshall
- Clifford May
- Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, USA retired
- Daniel McKivergan
- Joshua Muravchik
- Steven J. Nider
- Michael O'Hanlon
- Mackubin Thomas Owens
- Ralph Peters
- Danielle Pletka
- Stephen P. Rosen
- Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales, USA retired
- Randy Scheunemann
- Gary Schmitt
- Walter Slocombe
- James B. Steinberg
- R. James Woolsey