Document overview
This letter asked the Speaker of the House and the Senate majority leader to press for a substantial change in United States policy toward Iraq.
The authors argued that the containment strategy pursued during the 1990s was losing effectiveness. They maintained that disputes over weapons inspections, sanctions and Iraq's cooperation with United Nations monitors had weakened the existing framework.
context
This page paraphrases a historical advocacy document. It records the authors' policy position at the time and should not be read as a present-day endorsement or as an independent verification of every claim.
Argument presented in the letter
The authors referred to their January 1998 communication to President Bill Clinton, in which they had urged a strategy intended to remove Saddam Hussein's government. They contended that continued reliance on inspections and sanctions would eventually leave Iraq less constrained.
Discussing the February 1998 agreement negotiated by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the letter questioned whether inspectors had received the access and authority necessary to assess prohibited weapons programs. It cited concerns attributed to weapons inspectors about incomplete declarations, altered sites and administrative limits on inspection work.
The letter also criticized reductions in the United States military presence in the Gulf. Its authors believed that sanctions were eroding and that the expanded humanitarian oil program would further reduce international pressure on the Iraqi government.
Consequences anticipated by the authors
The letter framed its warnings as projections rather than established outcomes. It argued that a failure to change policy could:
- damage United States credibility and its ability to lead allied policy;
- weaken international efforts to limit the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons;
- increase risks to American forces and regional allies;
- give the Iraqi government greater leverage in Middle Eastern affairs; and
- encourage nearby governments to accommodate Baghdad's demands.
Measures proposed to Congress
The authors urged Congress to use constitutionally appropriate powers to promote a new approach. They acknowledged earlier congressional support for Iraqi opposition groups and an international radio service, but argued that additional action was needed.
The stated objective was the replacement of Saddam Hussein's government by a peaceful, representative and democratic political order. To pursue that goal, the letter proposed:
- challenging the Iraqi government's claim to legitimacy and seeking legal accountability for alleged international crimes;
- providing economic, political and military assistance to a representative provisional authority in territory beyond the government's control;
- using American and allied power to protect areas outside Baghdad's control in northern and southern Iraq; and
- maintaining a substantial regional military presence to defend United States interests and support the broader strategy.
The conclusion argued that Iraq's government remained vulnerable to sustained political and military pressure. It warned that postponing action could make a later confrontation more difficult and costly.
Signatories listed on the document
The source identifies the following signatories:
- Elliott Abrams
- William J. Bennett
- Jeffrey Bergner
- John R. Bolton
- Paula Dobriansky
- Francis Fukuyama
- Robert Kagan
- Zalmay Khalilzad
- William Kristol
- Richard Perle
- Peter Rodman
- Donald Rumsfeld
- William Schneider Jr.
- Vin Weber
- Paul Wolfowitz
- R. James Woolsey
- Robert B. Zoellick